Metaphors and models in legal theory by Makela, Finn
Metaphors and Models in Legal Theory*
Finn MAKELA**
In this article, the author argues that metaphors can be used as the 
basis for creating models in legal theory. Drawing on the literature on 
metaphor from the philosopy of language, he contends that metaphors 
are best understood as speech acts that propose a hypothesis of similarity 
between two separate domains. This kind of domain mapping, he argues, 
is the same procedure that underlies many scientific models, which allow 
us to transpose our understanding of well-understood phenomena to other 
areas of inquiry. He concludes with the assertion that — far from being 
merely ornamental uses of language or rhetorical devices — metaphors 
are important methodological tools in both the construction and critique 
of legal theory.
Dans l’article qui suit, l’auteur avance que les métaphores peuvent 
servir de fondement à la création de modèles en théorie du droit. 
S’inspirant de la littérature philosophique portant sur la métaphore, il 
soumet d’abord que les métaphores doivent être comprises comme étant 
des actes de langage par lesquels une relation de similitude est proposée 
entre deux domaines distincts. Ensuite, il soutient que ce procédé de trans-
position est à la base de plusieurs modèles scientifiques. De tels modèles 
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permettraient de traduire les connaissances de phénomènes bien connus 
à d’autres champs d’études. En conclusion, l’auteur prétend que les 
métaphores sont loin d’être de simples figures rhétoriques. Elles seraient 
plutôt des outils méthodologiques importants pour la construction et la 
critique de théories juridiques.
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SHREK:  For your information, there’s a lot more to ogres than people think.
DONKEY:  Example?
SHREK:  Example? Okay, um, ogres are like onions. (he holds out his onion)
DONKEY:  (sniffs the onion) They stink?
SHREK:  Yes – No!
DONKEY:  They make you cry?
SHREK:  No!
DONKEY:  You leave them in the sun, they get all brown, start sproutin’ little 
white hairs.
SHREK:  No! Layers! Onions have layers. Ogres have layers! Onions have 
layers. You get it? We both have layers. (he heaves a sigh and then 
walks off).
DONKEY:  (trailing after Shrek) Oh, you both have layers. Oh. {Sniffs} You 
know, not everybody likes onions. Cake! Everybody loves cakes! 
Cakes have layers.
SHREK:  I don’t care… what everyone likes. Ogres are not like cakes.
DONKEY:  You know what else everybody likes? Parfait. Have you ever met a 
person, you say, “Let’s get some parfait,” they say, “Hell no, I don’t 
like no parfait”? Parfaits are delicious.
SHREK:  No! You dense, irritating, miniature beast of burden! Ogres are like 
onions! End of story.
 Bye-bye. See ya later1.
 1. Andrew ADAMSON and Vicky JENSON (Dirs.), Shrek, Dreamworks SKG, 2001.
3202_droit_vol_52#3-4_sept-de c_11.indd   398 11-12-01   14:51
F. Makela Metaphors and Models in Legal Theory 399 
What can we do when confronted with the claim that law has layers2? 
Or that as the law evolves its form is tending more towards that of a 
network than of a pyramid3? That these are examples of metaphors about 
the law is clear enough. But how we are to evaluate metaphorical claims 
about the law is less clear.
Often when we come across a metaphor about the law, it is simply a 
rhetorical device — a convincing or memorable way to make a point that 
could be made otherwise. At least sometimes, however, the use of meta-
phor in the analysis of the law goes beyond a clever turn of phrase. The 
purpose of this article is to interrogate just such cases. In the first substan-
tive section I draw some distinctions that clarify some of the different ways 
we can think about metaphor and the law. The remainder of the article is 
aimed at identifying a working theory of the role of metaphors — and their 
more systematic cousins, models — in legal theory.
1 Four Relationships Between Metaphor and Law
A metaphor is “[a] figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term 
is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that which 
it is properly applicable4”. What is the relationship between these figures 
of speech and law? The answer to this question will vary depending on the 
context in which metaphor is mobilized and thus there is no single pheno-
menon covered by the rubric “metaphor and the law”. Rather, this field of 
inquiry covers a multiplicity of phenomena. Upon reflection, we can see 
 2. Craig MCTAGGART, “A Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis”, (2003) 48 McGill 
L.J. 571.
 3. François OST and Michel VAN DE KERCHOVE, De la pyramide au réseau? Pour une 
théorie dialectique du droit, Brussels, Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-
Louis, 2002.
 4. The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, Clarendon Press, s.v. “metaphor”. See also: 
John A. CUDDON, A Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, 4th ed., Oxford, 
 Blackwell, 1998, s.v. “metaphor”: “A figure of speech in which one thing is described 
in terms of another”; William HARMON and Hugh HOLMAN, A Handbook to Literature, 
11th ed., Upper Saddle River, Prentice Hall, 2009, s.v. “metaphor”: “An analogy identi-
fying one object with another and ascribing to the first object one or more of the qualities 
of the second.” These are all definitions of “metaphor” in a narrow sense. The term is 
also used as a class that groups other figures of speech such as metonymy (one word 
substituted for another with which it is closely associated), simile (an explicit comparison 
using the words “like” or “as”), and synecdoche (use of a part to represent the whole). 
On the narrow and broad senses of “metaphor”, see Edward QUINN, A Dictionary of 
Literary and Thematic Terms, 2nd ed., New York, Facts On File, 2006, s.v. “metaphor”. 
As I use the word “metaphor” in this article as a term of art rather than a general concept, 
I mean to use it in the narrow sense.
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that there are at least four distinct ways in which we might be interested 
in the relationship between metaphors and law.
First, we might look at what could be called “legal metaphors”. The 
object of interest would be how the law figures as a metaphor in non-
legal texts. For example, Shakespeare’s Sonnet 46 is structured as liti-
gation between the author’s heart and his eye, complete with pleadings 
and verdict5. Another example is Kant’s claim that the Critique of Pure 
Reason is a “tribunal” that will apply the laws of reason and make it “secure 
in its rightful claims6”. From this perspective, the objects of study include 
metaphor itself as a literary device, as well as the ways in which the symbo-
lism of the law frames our thoughts about any number of subjects, from 
love to reason.
Second, we may take an interest in metaphors in law, that is, how 
metaphors are used to illustrate points within legal texts. Here, the study 
of metaphor is subsumed under a larger category of analysis: the use of 
rhetoric in legal reasoning7. From this perspective, legal texts are a “literary 
genre8” and metaphor is one technique — among others — that the author 
uses to “discharge the […] persuasive burden9”. Consider, for example, 
Viscount Sankey’s famous remark in Woolmington v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions: “Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one 
golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution 
 5. For a detailed analysis of the legal terminology used in Sonnet 46, see Baron John 
 CAMPBELL, Shakespeare’s Legal Acquirements Considered, New York, D. Appleton, 
1859, p. 126 and 127. For a review of the many legal metaphors used throughout 
 Shakespeare’s work, see Thomas REGNIER, “Could Shakespeare Think Like a Lawyer? 
How Inheritance Law Issues in Hamlet May Shed Light on the Authorship Question”, 
(2002-03) 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 377.
 6. Immanuel KANT, The Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Werner S. PLUHAR, Indian-
apolis, Hackett, 1996, A xii, p. 8. On Kant’s use of legal metaphors in the First Critique, 
see Eve W. STODDARD, “Reason on Trial: Legal Metaphors in the Critique of Pure 
Reason”, Philosophy and Literature, vol. 12, No. 2, October 1988, p. 245.
 7. See e.g. Haig A. BOSMAJIAN, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions, Carbondale, 
Southern Illinois Press, 1992.
 8. Benjamin L. BERGER, “Trial by Metaphor: Rhetoric, Innovation, and the Juridical Text”, 
(2002) 39-3 Court Review 30, 30, referring to judicial opinions.
 9. Id., 32. For a stronger version of the same claim, see Jan G. DEUTSCH, “Law as Metaphor: 
A Structural Analysis of Legal Process”, (1977-78) 66 Geo. L.J. 1339, 1346: “a judicial 
opinion works the way a metaphor works”. See also: Ronald DWORKIN, Law’s Empire, 
Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1986, p. 228 ff., comparing jurisprudence to a “chain novel” 
written by many novelists; James B. WHITE, The Legal Imagination, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1985, p. 211-242, comparing judges to poets.
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to prove the prisoner’s guilt subject to what I have already said as to the 
defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception10.”
The metaphor of a “golden thread” running through the “web” of the 
law convincingly illustrates the point that a single principle unites the dispa-
rate norms of the common law in criminal matters. Furthermore, the meta-
phor functions to restrict subsequent judicial interpretations by framing 
later analysis. A later judgement that denied the claim that in criminal 
matters the Crown must prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable 
doubt would be open to the charge that it was thereby “severing” the “single 
golden thread”.
Conversely, a metaphor may be used rhetorically to allow for expan-
sive interpretation. For instance Viscount Sankey (who clearly had a 
penchant for such metaphors) supplied Canadian constitutional law with 
the principle that the Constitution should be given a “large and liberal 
interpretation” by stating that: “[t]he British North America Act planted 
in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural 
limits11”.
A third relationship between metaphor and law that may be of interest 
could be called metaphors of law. The inquiry here focuses on how legal 
reasoning itself is metaphorical and how the very concepts and categories 
of the law are shot through with metaphors. This approach can be distin-
guished from the analysis of metaphors in law in so far as metaphor is taken 
not just as a rhetorical trope that helps makes a legal point persuasive, 
but as a constitutive element of the law12. This perspective draws from 
cognitive science, to which we owe “cognitive metaphor theory13”. The 
10. Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462, 481 (H.L.).
11. Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124, 136 (P.C.). The examples of 
Woolmington and Edwards as examples of restrictive and expansive metaphors respec-
tively are drawn from B.L. BERGER, supra, note 8, 123. For an extended discussion of 
the role of the metaphors of trees, roots, and branches in the description of the law’s 
hierarchical organization, see Marie-Claude PRÉMONT, Tropismes du droit. Logique 
métaphorique et logique métonymique du langage juridique, Montreal, Liber/Thémis, 
2003, p. 25-78. For a critical evaluation of the “living tree” metaphor, see Bradley W. 
MILLER, “Beguiled By Metaphors: The “Living Tree” and Originalist Constitutional 
Interpretation in Canada”, (2009) 22 Can. J.L. Juris. 331, 354, arguing that the “living 
tree” is an “unhelpful and obscuring metapho[r]”.
12. See e.g.: James E. MURRAY, “Understanding Law as Metaphor”, (1984) 34 J. Legal Educ. 
714; M.-C. PRÉMONT, supra, note 11.
13. The locus classicus of cognitive metaphor theory is George LAKOFF and Mark JOHNSON, 
Metaphors We Live By, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980. For a discussion 
by Lakoff on the relationship between cognitive metaphor theory and the law, see 
George LAKOFF, “Cognitive Science and the Law”, Paper presented to the Legal Theory 
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fundamental thesis of cognitive metaphor theory can be stated as follows: 
“This theory reconstructs the foundation in which metaphor was seen as 
merely literary or rhetorical in contrast with the “real” literal and scientific 
world. In cognitive theory, metaphor is not only a way of seeing or saying; 
it is a way of thinking and knowing, the method by which we structure and 
reason, and it is fundamental, not ornamental14.”
In contrast to metaphors in law, metaphors of law are not concepts 
that are metaphorically stated for rhetorical reasons, but metaphorical 
concepts. For instance, the notion of “standing” is defined as “[a] party’s 
right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right15”. 
Derived from the Latin locus standi (literally “place of standing”), the 
concept appeals to the image of standing up before the tribunal. A whole 
complex of metaphors in English relate this image of physical presence by 
standing to the vindication of a right or claim (“stand up and be heard”, “I 
won’t stand for it”, “stand one’s ground”, etc.). Unlike Viscount Sankey’s 
“single golden thread” or “living tree”, the metaphor of “standing” is not a 
persuasive way to describe a legal concept; it is the legal concept16.
Metaphors of law are not limited to its concepts, but also the rela-
tionships between them. Marie-Claude Prémont argues that the entire 
structure of the law is inextricable from the tree metaphor, with the roots 
representing the sources of the law and the branches representing its 
divisions:
Il est tout à fait remarquable que le droit ait réussi à déployer son organisation 
arborescente à partir d’un minimum de métaphores structurantes, sans être obligé 
de nommer explicitement la grande métaphore de l’arbre. La conception métapho-
rique du droit en synthétise l’organisation interne à partir de la seule description 
structurale, organisationnelle et fonctionnelle des racines, des branches et des rela-
tions qui les unissent. Les notions de racines et de branches ne sont pas seulement 
des outils de la raison juridique, elles la fondent et la définissent17.
Workshop Series, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, September 29, 1989, Working 
Paper WS 1989-90-(2), esp. at 43-46. For a thorough application of cognitive metaphor 
theory to legal reasoning, see Steven L. WINTER, “Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric 
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law”, (1988-89) 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105.
14. Linda L. BERGER, “What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive 
Theory of Metaphor can Help Lawyers Shape the Law”, (2004) 2 Journal of the Associa-
tion of Legal Writing Directors 169, 170.
15. Bryan A. GARNER (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., St. Paul, Thomson/West, 2007, 
s.v. “standing”.
16. Steven L. WINTER, “The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance”, 
(1987-88) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, provides an extended critique of the notion of standing 
using cognitive metaphor theory.
17. M.-C. PRÉMONT, supra, note 11, p. 26.
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It is clear that Prémont understands the tree metaphor to be conceptual 
and not purely linguistic or rhetorical, as evidenced by her claim that the 
metaphor needn’t be named (though of course, it may be18).
Finally — and most importantly, for my purposes — there are meta-
phors about the law. A metaphor about the law is a way of making claims 
regarding law (or a part of the law) as a phenomenon per se. Consider the 
following well-known passage from the preface to Marx’s Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy:
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite rela-
tions, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appro-
priate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. 
The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness19.
Marx’s architectural metaphor has all the rhetorical advantages of the 
literary trope; it uses a simple and concrete image to convey a complex and 
abstract claim. But it is more than just a persuasive way of stating what 
could easily be stated literally. The metaphor of foundation and super-
structure makes a substantive claim about the law. Marx posits an ontology 
of the law: the legal and the political are not like a superstructure, they are 
a superstructure20. We can thus say that the metaphor does not merely 
fulfill an aesthetic function, but also an epistemic one in so far as it serves 
to generate knowledge about the world21.
From Marx’s simple metaphor, a large number of conclusions can be 
drawn about the law. Whether we (metaphorically!) describe the metaphor 
as a framework, a lens or a map22, it serves to organize our experience 
by highlighting some features of the world while overlooking others23. 
18. The “celebrated exception” to this tacitness, according to M.-C. Prémont, is Edwards v. 
Attorney General of Canada, supra, note 10, see the omitted footnote from the passage 
cited: supra, note 17.
19. Karl MARX, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Moscow, Progress 
Publishers, 1970, p. 20 and 21 [emphasis added].
20. The same point is made in Max BLACK, “More about Metaphor”, Dialectica, vol. 31, 
Nos. 3&4, December 1977, p. 431, at pages 445 and 446, using the example “I didn’t say 
that he is like an echo; I said and meant that he is an echo!”.
21. An extended analysis of Marx’s architectural metaphor can be found in Gerald A. 
COHEN, Karl Marx’s Theory of History. A Defence, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 2001, p. 216-248.
22. L.L. BERGER, supra, note 14, 169 and 170.
23. Max BLACK, “Metaphor”, in M. BLACK, Models and Metaphors. Studies in Language 
and Philosophy, New York, Cornell University Press, 1962, p. 25, at pages 41 and 42, 
arguing that we “see through” metaphors.
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Furthermore, this organizing function allows us to compare, contrast and 
order empirical observations about the law using the metaphor as a stan-
dard. For example, we might notice that freedom of contract is an important 
principle of most modern legal systems. From this observation, we can ask 
what features of the economic base correspond to or determine this feature 
of the legal superstructure. We can then go on to ask whether these features 
are also related to other features of the same legal system, for instance 
the law of successions24. In other words, Marx’s metaphor provides us 
with an elementary model for understanding the law. It is this relationship 
between metaphors about the law and models of law — and in particular 
how understanding this relationship is important for legal theory25 — that 
I want to explore in the remainder of this article26.
24. A large body of Marxist legal theory is concerned with exactly this type of question. See 
e.g.: Evgeny B. PASHUKANIS, “The General Theory of Law and Marxism”, in  Pashukanis: 
Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, edited by Piers BEIRNE and Robert SHARLET, 
New York, Academic Press, 1980, p. 40; Karl RENNER, The Institutions of Private Law 
and Their Social Functions, translated by Agnes SCHWARTZCHILD, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1979.
25. The use of metaphors about the law is certainly not limited to legal theory. Metaphors 
about the law can be found in judgements, legal treatises, and indeed anywhere where 
a particular view of the nature of the law, or of legal processes and institutions, is 
advanced. However, this article is limited to metaphors about the law in the context of 
legal theory.
26. One could argue that the difference between metaphors in law and metaphors of law 
is merely one of degree. On this view, metaphors of law are simply those metaphors 
in law that have been so often repeated that they have “died”; E. QUINN, supra, note 
4, s.v. “dead metaphors” are “phrases whose original, metaphorical character has been 
blunted by everyday use”. Though my personal view is that the cognitivist approach 
describes something deeper and epistemologically more important than the passage 
from “live” to “dead” metaphors, I am not prepared to defend this intuition here. For a 
critical discussion of the notion of “dead metaphor”, see George LAKOFF, “The Death of 
Dead Metaphor”, Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, vol. 2, No. 2, 1987, p. 143. See also 
M. BLACK, “Metaphor”, supra, note 23, at pages 32-34, describing the view that dead 
metaphors are a species of catachresis, i.e. “the use of a word to remedy a gap in the 
vocabulary”. Similarly, one could make the argument that (some) metaphors of law that 
are sufficiently important ground (some) metaphors about law. Thus, M.-C. Prémont’s 
account of the role of the tree metaphor is not just a description of the use of a conceptual 
metaphor within legal reasoning, but a positive claim about the (tree-like) nature of the 
law. I think that this argument involves the same category mistake that I discuss at the 
beginning of the next section. In any case, I do not advance that the fourfold typology I 
have proposed in the analysis of the relationship between metaphor and law is anything 
other than a heuristic device.
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2 Metaphors and Models: What They Mean and What They Do
While there is a substantial literature on (what I have called) legal 
metaphors, metaphors in law and metaphors of law, there is little published 
research that theorizes metaphors about law27. This is not to say that theo-
rists do not make abundant use of metaphors in thinking about the law; 
legal theory is rife with metaphor28. Typically, however, metaphor is mobi-
lized without an explicit defence of its use. In the few works that do defend 
the use of metaphor, the defence is based either (a) on a general claim that 
metaphors are important to thought29, or (b) on a claim that law is an inhe-
rently discursive phenomenon30. Whereas (a) is true, it is not particularly 
satisfying as a defence of methodology. On the other hand, (b) constitutes 
essentially a category mistake. It is a non sequitur to claim that since some 
X has a property Y that a theory of X should also have property Y. Dogs 
may bark, but it would be absurd to claim that therefore a theory of canine 
communication barks!
This does not mean, however, that we are without any resources for 
thinking about the role of metaphor in legal theory. Significant work has 
been done on the analysis of metaphor generally and on the relationship 
between metaphors and models in particular. In the remainder of this 
section I provide a brief overview of the state of (some aspects of) meta-
phor theory, ultimately arguing that metaphors are best understood as a 
kind of speech act. Drawing primarily on the work of the philosopher Max 
Black, I then provide a sketch of the relationship between metaphors and 
models, paying particular attention to their role in legal theory.
2.1 The Meaning of Metaphor
The standard view of metaphor is that it involves the transfer of a term 
from the object to which it designates to another object that it designates 
27. Three exceptions are: Roderick A. MACDONALD, “Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in 
International Context”, (2008-09) 34 Brook. J. Int’l L. 603; Bernard J. HIBBITTS, “Making 
Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal 
Discourse”, (1994-95) 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 229; Philip SOPER, “Metaphors and Models of 
Law: The Judge as Priest”, (1976-77) 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1196.
28. To cite just two “classics” consider: Thomas HOBBES, Leviathan, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1968 (the metaphor of a commonwealth being a person); Herbert L.A. 
HART, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994 (the meta-
phor of law having an open texture).
29. See e.g. Jean-Guy BELLEY, “Une métaphore chimique pour le droit”, in J.-G. BELLEY 
(ed.), Le droit soluble. Contributions québécoises à l’étude de l’internormativité, Paris, 
L.G.D.J., 1996, p. 7, at page 20.
30. See e.g. J.B. WHITE, supra, note 9, p. 2.
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by analogy or comparison31. According to this “comparison view”, which 
is attributed to Aristotle32, a metaphor is essentially an ellipsis of a simile33. 
Like metaphor, simile is a figure of speech that compares one thing to 
another, but unlike metaphors similes are explicit comparisons, generally 
indicated by the use of the words “like” or “as”34. In asserting that meta-
phors are (just) elliptical similes, the comparison view thus advances not 
only a definition of metaphor, but also a theory of metaphor meaning. 
Indeed, the comparison view is a special case of a more general perspec-
tive, according to which a metaphor means something other than the literal 
words out of which it is composed35.
Returning to our example, the comparison view would hold that 
Marx’s architectural metaphor is simply a way of saying (something like): 
“the economic is like a foundation; the political and the legal are like a 
superstructure; and furthermore the relationship between the economic, 
the political, and the legal, is like the relationship between a foundation 
and a superstructure”.
31. See supra, note 4. This is consonant with the philology of the word “metaphor”, which 
derives from the Greek metaphoro – “transfer.”
32. “Poetics”, in ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric. Poetics, translated by W. Rhys ROBERTS and Ingram 
BYWATER, New York, Modern Library, 1954, p. 251 (1457b lines 8-11): “Metaphor 
consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference 
being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, 
or on grounds of analogy.”
33. See e.g.: John R. SEARLE, “Metaphor”, in Andrew ORTONY (ed.), Metaphor and Thought, 
2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 83, at pages 95 ff., describing 
“the comparison theory […] goes back to Aristotle and […] says all metaphor is really a 
literal simile with the “like” or “as” deleted”; M. BLACK, “Metaphor”, supra, note 23, at 
pages 35 ff., stating that this view of metaphor, as condensed simile or comparison, has 
been very popular. See also Donald DAVIDSON, “What Metaphors Mean”, in Aloysius 
P. MARTINICH (ed.), The Philosophy of Language, 4th ed., Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, p. 435, at pages 439-441.
34. J.A. CUDDON, supra, note 4, s.v. “simile”. See also: E. QUINN, supra, note 4, s.v. “simile”: 
“A comparison between two dissimilar things, usually connected by the words like or 
as”; W. HARMON and H. HOLMAN, supra, note 4, s.v. “simile”: “A figure in which a simi-
larity between two objects is directly expressed […] Most similes are introduced by as 
or like.”
35. M. BLACK, “More about Metaphor”, supra, note 20, at page 441, calls the more general 
perspective “the substitution view”. Citing Ivor A. RICHARDS, The Philosophy of 
Rhetoric, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1936, he claims that “the substitution view 
regards ‘the entire sentence that is the locus of the metaphor as replacing some set of 
literal sentences’; while the comparison view takes the imputed literal paraphrase to be a 
statement of some similarity or analogy, and so takes every metaphor to be a condensed 
or elliptic simile”.
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The comparison view suffers from several problems, the most serious 
of which is its vacuity. To gloss “the law is a superstructure” as “the law 
is like a superstructure” tells us nothing about the relation of similarity 
between the two. For the metaphor to have meaning, on the comparison 
view, would require us to know in what respects the law is like a super-
structure36. Thus the gloss would have to be something like: “the law has 
some set of properties (P1, P2 … Pn) and it is like a superstructure in that 
superstructures also have that set of properties37”. But this gloss demons-
trates the vacuity of the comparison view as a theory of metaphor meaning, 
since whatever set of properties that the law shares with a superstructure 
is not contained in the metaphor, but requires the interpreter to supply 
them38. Furthermore, the metaphor provides no guidance, in principle, for 
what set of properties should be used as comprising the similarity relation, 
since, as Donald Davidson put it: “everything is like everything39”, and in 
endless ways. 
2.2 Beyond Meaning: The Pragmatics of Metaphor
Some philosophers have attempted to retain a theory of metaphor 
based on metaphor meaning, either by rehabilitating the comparison 
view40 or by proposing another theory of meaning41. A more promising 
approach — in my view — is to refocus the analysis of metaphor from what 
metaphors mean to what metaphors do; that is, to analyse the pragmatics 
of metaphor.
36. If this criticism is well-founded then (if one holds the comparison view) it must also 
apply to any theory of simile meaning. I think it does. Note, however, that the criticism 
also applies to other theories of metaphor meaning that aren’t based on the comparison 
view. See D. DAVIDSON, supra, note 33, at pages 445 and 446.
37. Note that I am not claiming that this gloss of the metaphor would be adequate, nor 
indeed that metaphors can ever be correctly glossed as similes. I am simply positing 
what a gloss of the metaphor might look like if one held the comparison view; which I 
don’t. My view is that metaphors and similes are conceptually distinct and that, in any 
event, to analyze metaphor in terms of meaning is to bark up the wrong tree. Glossing the 
“barking up trees” metaphor as a simile is left as an exercise for the reader that should 
highlight some of the problems I have raised.
38. D. DAVIDSON, supra, note 33, at pages 436 and 437.
39. Id., at page 441.
40. See e.g. Andrew ORTONY, “The Role of Similarity in Similes and Metaphors”, in 
A. ORTONY (ed.), supra, note 33, p. 342.
41. See e.g. M. BLACK, “Metaphor”, supra, note 23, proposing an “interactive” view of meta-
phor that abandons the comparison view but maintains the centrality of metaphorical 
meaning. See also M. BLACK, “More about Metaphor”, supra, note 20, further fleshing 
out the interactive view.
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Pragmatics is that part of linguistic theory which focuses on what 
words do, rather than what they mean. Thus “[a] pragmatic treatment 
of a feature of the use of a language would explain the feature in terms 
of general principles governing appropriate utterance, rather than in terms 
of a semantic rule42”.
Typical cases of utterances that are not satisfactorily accounted for 
by semantic rules but which are readily explained by pragmatics include 
“performative” utterances (such as orders, threats and promises)43 and 
indirect speech acts (such as rhetorical questions44 and irony45). Some 
philosophers have suggested that metaphor should be added to this list46. 
Davidson states this view — which we can call “the speech act theory of 
metaphor” — in its strongest form:
No theory of metaphorical meaning or metaphorical truth can help explain how 
metaphor works. Metaphor runs on the same familiar linguistic tracks that the plai-
nest sentences do […] What distinguishes metaphor is not meaning but use – in this 
it is like assertion, hinting, lying, promising, or criticizing. And the special use to 
which we put language in metaphor is not – cannot be – to “say something” special, 
no matter how indirectly. For a metaphor says only what shows on its face47.
Note that this approach need not do violence to our common-sense 
intuitions about metaphor. Certainly, one of the things metaphors do (and 
perhaps what they do best) is to invite the hearer48 to make comparisons. 
Perhaps the best way to think about this is to say that the utterer of a 
metaphor is posing a hypothesis. This hypothesis can lead the hearer to 
see things differently, to notice relationships, analogies and similarities, 
etc. The metaphor doesn’t do this by bearing some special metaphorical 
42. Simon BLACKBURN, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, s.v. “pragmatics”.
43. See “Performative Utterances”, in John L. AUSTIN, Philosophical Papers, 3rd ed. by 
James O. URMSON and Geoffrey J. WARNOCK, New York, Oxford University Press, 
1979, p. 233. As Austin remarks, the law is rife with performative utterances, of which 
legislation and jury verdicts are just two obvious examples.
44. See John R. SEARLE, “Indirect Speech Acts”, in Peter COLE and Jerry L. MORGAN (eds.), 
Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3, New York, Academic Press, 1975, p. 59.
45. See Henk HAVERKATE, “A Speech Act Analysis of Irony”, Journal of Pragmatics, 
vol. 14, No. 1, February 1990, p. 77.
46. See e.g.: D. DAVIDSON, supra, note 33; J.R. SEARLE, supra, note 33; Jerry L. MORGAN, 
“Observations on the Pragmatics of Metaphor”, in A. ORTONY (ed.), supra, note 33, 
p. 124.
47. D. DAVIDSON, supra, note 33, at page 442. J.R. SEARLE, supra, note 33, at page 90, 
makes a nearly identical point: “strictly speaking, in metaphor there is never a change 
of meaning”.
48. In this section I use the standard terminology of pragmatics, including “speaker”, 
“hearer”, and “utterance”. Of course this also applies to written metaphors.
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meaning, but precisely because of its literal meaning. The fact that the 
utterance would be defective if interpreted literally acts as an indicator to 
the hearer that she it should embark upon such an interpretative exercise49.
Another advantage of the speech-act theory is that, in jettisoning the 
search for a literal meaning that can be inferred by “correctly” glossing a 
metaphor, it allows for the open-ended nature of metaphor. If, pace the 
comparison view, metaphors are just elliptical similes waiting to be trans-
lated into literal assertions, then metaphors have no particular creative role 
to play. And yet metaphors do play such a role, as Max Black explains: 
A memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cogni-
tive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate to the one as 
a lens for seeing the other; the implications, suggestions, and supporting values 
entwined with the literal use of the metaphorical expression enable us to see a 
new subject matter in a new way. The extended meanings that result, the relations 
between initially disparate realms created, can neither be antecedently predicted 
nor subsequently paraphrased in prose. We can comment upon the metaphor, but 
the metaphor itself neither needs nor invites explanation and paraphrase. Meta-
phorical thought is a distinctive mode of achieving insight, not to be construed as 
an ornamental substitute for plain thought50.
It is arguably this creative role that distinguishes metaphor from other 
speech-acts that rely upon hearer recognition of defectiveness as inter-
pretative indicators (such as irony)51.
Though the speech-act theory of metaphor provides a more satisfying 
explanation for metaphor than the comparison theory, it does not clearly 
account for metaphors about law like Marx’s base/superstructure descrip-
tion. On the speech-act view, Marx’s metaphor needn’t be glossed in order 
to discover an elliptical simile that will reveal the literal meaning for which 
the metaphor is a substitute. But if the “implications, suggestions, and 
supporting values” that the base/superstructure metaphor conjures are to 
genuinely provide a “distinctive insight”, then something more systematic 
is required. Marx’s metaphor functions as a rudimentary model.
49. For instance because if understood literally the utterance would be patently absurd, 
obviously false, or trivially true. See D. DAVIDSON, supra, note 33, at pages 441 and 442. 
See also J.R. SEARLE, supra, note 33, at page 103.
50. Max BLACK, “Models and Archetypes”, in M. BLACK, supra, note 23, p. 219, at 
pages 236 and 237.
51. See J.R. SEARLE, supra, note 33, at pages 108 and 109, claiming that metaphors function 
in a fashion similar to irony.
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2.3 From Metaphor to Model
Models and metaphors appear to work in a similar fashion. In both 
cases, insight is achieved by the projection of a phenomenon or set of 
phenomena onto another. But how does this projection function? As I 
proposed above, we can say that a metaphor proposes a hypothesis to the 
hearer, who then interprets its literal meaning to see a new subject matter 
in a new way. This is achieved by the projection of the complex of “impli-
cations, suggestions, and supporting values” beyond the literal meaning 
of the utterance. Following Max Black, I think a similar phenomenon is 
at work in the construction of models, with the primary difference being 
their systematic nature.
In the case of a scale model (of an airplane, for example), the rela-
tionship between the modelled object and the model is one of isomorphism. 
Two objects are isomorphic — from Greek “isos” (equal) and “morphe” 
(form) — when they are identical in form and proportion, though not neces-
sarily in size. Similarly, in mathematical logic, two logical languages are 
isomorphic when all the possible statements in one language have an equi-
valent in the second. When two languages are isomorphic, we say that the 
second language models the first52.
In a general sense, isomorphism also characterizes theoretical 
models53. We can say that X models Y in so far as the structure of X is 
reproduced in Y. Of particular interest is the structure of inference or of 
implication54. This allows us to “move” from a (relatively) well-known 
domain to a (relatively) unknown one. Thus, if X is some phenomenon 
about which we know that whenever it has property a it also has property 
b, then if Y is a model of X and we know that Y has property a, we can 
hypothesize that Y also has property b.
52. This is what is often called “classical model theory” in mathematical logic. It is the basis 
of Goëdel’s proof of the completeness theorem, in which he proved that no additional 
inference rules are required to prove all the logically valid formulas in a deductive 
system of first-order predicate calculus – i.e. first-order predicate calculus is “complete”. 
For a simpler proof of the same theorem, see Leon HENKIN, “The Completeness of the 
First-Order Functional Calculus”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 14, No. 3, September 
1949, p. 159. On model theory in general, see Alain BADIOU, Le concept de modèle. 
Introduction à une épistémologie matérialiste des mathématiques, Paris, Fayard, 2007. 
For a discussion of model theory and law, see William H. WIDEN, “Forcing Analogies 
in Law: Badiou, Set Theory, and Models”, (2007-08) 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2407.
53. M. BLACK, “Models and Archetypes”, supra, note 50, at page 222. See also M. BLACK, 
“More about Metaphor”, supra, note 20, at pages 443-445.
54. M. BLACK, “Models and Archetypes”, supra, note 50, at page 223: “The analogue model 
shares with its original not a set of features or an identical proportionality of magnitudes 
but, more abstractly, the same structure or pattern of relationships.”
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How can this conception of a model be applied to theories of law? 
And what is the relationship to metaphor? An example is in order. I have 
hypothesized elsewhere that, in some cases, legal norms transmission is 
viral55. This is clearly a metaphor; legal norms are no more viruses than 
ogres are onions. But it also suggests that some of the features of virus 
transmission (a field about which there is a significant amount of detailed 
knowledge) are also features of unintentional norm transmission between 
jurisdictions (a field about which we know very little): “[e]very metaphor 
is the tip of a submerged model56”. Of course, a substantial amount of 
work needs to be done before the metaphor becomes a model. Max Black 
describes the difference between the two as follows:
Use of theoretical models resembles the use of metaphors in requiring analogical 
transfer of a vocabulary. Metaphor and model-making reveal new relationships; 
both are attempts to pour new content into old bottles. But a metaphor operates 
largely with commonplace implications. You need only proverbial knowledge, as 
it were, to have your metaphor understood; but the maker of a scientific model 
must have prior control of a well-knit scientific theory if he is to do more than 
hang an attractive picture on an algebraic formula. Systematic complexity of the 
source of the model and capacity for analogical development are of the essence57.
Thus, the metaphor “legal norms are viruses”, which is based on the 
“proverbial knowledge” that viruses are self-replicating organisms that 
spread across a host population through a process of infection can be 
transformed into a model. What is required is (a) a deeper understanding 
of the various entities and relationships that constitute viral epidemiology, 
and (b) “projection” of these entities and relationships onto empirical obser-
vations of legal norm transmission58.
This move from an initial metaphor, which creatively suggests a simi-
larity relation, to a full-blown model, which links a defined pair of domains 
using a mapping function, is commonplace in scientific reasoning59. A stan-
dard example is the Rutherford-Bohr model of the atom. Ernest Rutherford 
55. Finn MAKELA, “The Drug Testing Virus”, (2009) 43 R.J.T. 651.
56. M. BLACK, supra, note 20, at page 445.
57. M. BLACK, supra, note 50, at pages 238 and 239.
58. Further work along precisely these lines can be found in Finn MAKELA, Explaining Legal 
Norm Transmission Using an Epidemiological Model: The Case of Employment Drug 
Testing, LL.D. Thesis, Montreal, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal, 2010 [Online] 
[https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/jspui/handle/1866/4793] (August 4th, 2011).
59. The relationship between metaphors and scientific models set out in this paragraph and 
the following one is not intended as a novel contribution, but an introduction using two 
examples for the unacquainted. A useful overview can be found in Daniela M. BAILER-
JONES, “Models, Metaphors and Analogies”, in Peter MACHAMER and Michael SILBERS-
TEIN (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, 
p. 108.
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proposed to replace J.J. Thompson’s “plum pudding” metaphor of the atom, 
with that of the solar system. The atom, Rutherford hypothesized, is a tiny 
solar system, with electrons occupying the role of planets and a nucleus 
standing in for the sun. Niels Bohr went on to “project” properties of orbi-
ting bodies from the well-known (in this respect) domain of astronomy 
onto the target domain of atomic physics. This allowed him to discover 
and (mathematically) describe electron orbit paths60.
Other examples of the use of metaphors to create models in the natural 
sciences abound. For instance, Darwin’s use of the “tree of life” meta-
phor61 to describe the evolution of species by natural selection, forms 
the basis of much more systematic models in evolutionary biology62. As 
with Bohr’s solar system model of the atom, the tree of life is not just a 
way to communicate existing knowledge, but a method for generating new 
understanding63.
Some provisos apply to this sketch of a methodology of moving from 
metaphor to model. First, it must be admitted that the process of projec-
tion implies a choice. Just as metaphors do not have a single meaning just 
waiting to be translated into literal speech, the different domains of know-
ledge related by a model do not have a single set of mapping or translating 
functions just waiting to be discovered. Every model carries with it “risks 
of fallacious inferences from inevitable irrelevancies64”. Though the choices 
involved in proposing a mapping function carry risks, they are also what 
make the modelling methodology a rich one, since an explicit articulation 
60. This version of Bohr’s use of the solar system metaphor is drawn from Robert R. 
HOFFMAN, “Metaphor in Science”, in Richard P. HONECK and R.R. HOFFMAN (eds.), 
Cognition and Figurative Language, Hillsdale, Erlbaum, 1980, p. 393, at pages 409 and 
410. For a book length treatment, see Sandro PETRUCCIOLI, Atoms, Metaphors and Para-
doxes. Niels Bohr and the Construction of a New Physics, translated by Ian MCGILVRAY, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
61. Tellingly, the branching tree is the only diagram in Charles DARWIN, On the Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life, London, John Murray, 1859, p. 117.
62. See e.g. W. Ford DOOLITTLE, “Phylogenetic Classification and the Universal Tree”, 
Science, vol. 284, No. 5423, June 25, 1999, p. 2124, discussing the construction of a 
“universal tree of life” by phylogeneticists using comparative analysis of nucleotide 
sequences of genes encoding ribosomal RNAs.
63. For an accessible review, see David A. BAUM, Stacey DEWITT SMITH and Samuel S.S. 
DONOVAN, “The Tree-Thinking Challenge”, Science, vol. 310, No. 5750, November 11, 
2005, p. 979, at page 979, claiming that phylogenetics as a field is “complex and rapidly 
changing, replete with a dense statistical literature, impassioned philosophical debates, 
and an abundance of highly technical computer programs [but that] [o]ne cannot really 
understand phylogenetics if one is not clear what an evolutionary tree is”.
64. M. BLACK, supra, note 50, p. 219, at page 223.
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and defence of these choices allows us to further apprehend the domains 
under investigation. In qualifying the analogies proposed in a model, we 
engage in what Wilfrid Sellars calls a “commentary” on it:
[T]he fundamental assumptions of a theory are usually developed not by construc-
ting uninterpreted calculi which might correlate in the desired manner with obser-
vational discourse, but rather by attempting to find a model, i.e. to describe a 
domain of familiar objects behaving in familiar ways such that we can see how 
the phenomena to be explained would arise if they consisted of this sort of thing. 
The essential thing about a model is that it is accompanied, so to speak, by a 
commentary which qualifies or limits – but not precisely nor in all respects – the 
analogy between the familiar objects and the entities which are being introduced 
by the theory65.
Much of qualifying commentary is often implicit because it is obvious; 
of course the Rutherford-Bohr model doesn’t contend that an atom’s 
nucleus gives off light (like the sun) nor that electrons might support life 
(as at least one planet does). Where commentary adds to the model is preci-
sely those areas in which we choose to overlook disanalogies between the 
primary and secondary domains that are not obviously irrelevant. Thus, to 
return to the metaphor “legal norms are viruses”, in constructing our model 
we might choose to overlook the mechanisms of infection and replication in 
an individual host (virology) in order to focus on the concepts of transmis-
sion and spread across a host population (epidemiology)66. A priori, neither 
domain offers a “better” theory, but an accompanying commentary serves 
to explain — and to justify — the chosen domain.
Another proviso is that, just as a metaphor proposes a hypothesis to 
the interpreter, so a model proposes a set of hypotheses about the target 
domain. These hypotheses must still be tested67. In other words, a model is 
a methodology of hypothesis generation that allows us to “see connections” 
65. Wilfrid SELLARS, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, Harvard 
 University Press, 1997, p. 96.
66. For such a defence, see F. MAKELA, supra, note 58, p. 136-138.
67. The examples that I have used herein might be taken as supporting the charge that I hold 
a restrictive definition of legal theory that privileges “scientistic” reasoning about empi-
rically verifiable claims over purely conceptual work. I do not wish to commit myself to 
that view. Indeed, I believe models that generate entirely conceptual hypotheses whose 
verification proceeds entirely by thought experiment or by evaluation according to a 
standard of internal coherence can be accounted for by the description of models that I 
have set out. If it turns out that this is not the case, then so much the worse for models, 
but it is not a position that I intend to defend in this article.
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that would otherwise be overlooked68; it is not a methodology of hypothesis 
verification69.
Finally, in choosing to extend a metaphor to a model, one must be 
prepared to run the risk that the expected isomorphism does not reveal 
itself. Not every secondary domain “fits” the domain on which we would 
like to model it70. 
2.4 Metaphors, Models and Critique 
Understanding the role that metaphors and models can play in legal 
theory building can also ground critiques of existing literature. For example, 
one of the most successful set of models applied to legal phenomena are 
those developed and espoused by the law and economics movement. These 
models are an extension of a series of metaphors that could be described 
as: “all human interactions are market transactions”. The movement from 
this collection of metaphors to law and economics models is extremely 
complex, however, and involves multiple steps. Take the argument that 
the common law maximizes the efficiency of rules through litigation, for 
instance71. This relies on the metaphor that competition between potential 
rules is like competition between firms in a marketplace. The idealized 
version of competition between firms in a marketplace is itself an exten-
sion of the metaphor whereby reproductive success is analogized to the 
teleological notion of “fitness” for a purpose, which in turn comes from 
Darwinian or quasi-Darwinian theories of evolution. This metaphor of 
competition in a contest where the prize is survival was itself borrowed 
by Darwin from Malthus72. My point here is not to mount a critique of the 
law and economics movement, nor of the models that are mobilized by its 
proponents, but to draw attention to the ways in which those models are 
developed from metaphors.
68. M. BLACK, supra, note 50, at page 237.
69. Though in the case of a very strong model, in which many hypotheses are confirmed, 
the model’s other predictions may constitute, in themselves, prima facie evidence for 
further hypotheses.
70. M. BLACK, supra, note 50, at page 238.
71. See e.g. Paul H. RUBIN, “Why Is the Common Law Efficient?”, (1977) 6 J. Legal Stud. 51. 
For an overview, see Francesco PARISI, “The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypo-
thesis”, in Charles K. ROWLEY and Friedrich SCHNEIDER (eds.), The Encyclopedia of 
Public Choice, vol. 2, New York, Kluwer Academic, 2004, p. 519.
72. See e.g. Sandra HERBERT, “Darwin, Malthus, and Selection”, Journal of the History 
of Biology, vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1971, p. 209; but see also Peter J. BOWLER, “Malthus, 
Darwin, and the Concept of Struggle”, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 37, No. 4, 
October-December 1976, p. 631, arguing that there were significant differences in the way 
Malthus and Darwin mobilized the concept of “struggle”.
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Recognizing that a model has its roots in the metaphor is the first step 
in mounting a critique thereof. I do not think that identifying the use of the 
metaphor-to-model methodology is a critique in itself. Indeed, this article 
is predicated upon my firm conviction that the methodology is both useful 
and intellectually defensible. For any given model, however, one must ask 
relevant questions about the choice of primary and secondary domains and 
the choice of mapping functions between their analogous concepts. This 
is especially important when the model is not accompanied by a commen-
tary (in Sellars’ sense) and provides a constructive way of reacting when 
“confronted by a theory which purports merely to describe, when it not 
only plainly prescribes, but owes its special prescriptive powers precisely 
to the fact that it disclaims prescriptive intentions73”.
Conclusion
Legal scholars who venture beyond the doctrinal exposition and 
analysis of “black letter law” tend to think of themselves as engaging in 
some form of social science or philosophy. As such, we tend to view meta-
phors with some suspicion. After all, metaphors are the realm of literature 
and rhetoric; reliance upon them to do substantive intellectual work smacks 
of methodological sloppiness. Models, on the other hand, have the ring of 
rigour, and most of us would readily admit to using them — if only we could 
figure out what they were.
What I hope to have shown in this article is that there is no need 
to look askance at metaphor. Metaphor can be a powerful methodolo-
gical tool, both as a method for generating new understanding and as a 
basis upon which models may be constructed. Finally, there is nothing 
 mysterious about models. Properly understood, they can be useful both in 
generating new hypotheses about the law and critiquing existing theories.
73. This quote from Lon L. FULLER, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor 
Hart”, (1957-58) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 632, is with reference to positivism, not to law and 
economics. Any doubt that the quote applies also to law and economics may be easily 
extinguished by consulting recent reports by the OECD and World Bank on the rela-
tive efficiency of legal systems. For an overview of these reports, see Claude MÉNARD 
and Bertrand Du MARAIS, “Can We Rank Legal Systems According to their Economic 
Efficiency?”, (2008) 26 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 55.
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